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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Clayton Robert Adams appeals from the district court‟s order denying his
motion for credit for time served on his sentence for aggravated battery.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The Idaho Court of Appeals summarized the facts underlying Adams‟
convictions for second degree murder and aggravated battery as follows:
Three friends, Tyler Gorley, Stephen Maylin and Mikeal
Campbell, were leaving a Caldwell bar at closing time when they
ran into Adams and his friend, Sergio Madrigal, outside the
entrance. Campbell spoke to Adams, whom he knew, and the
group decided to go to a private party at another location, with the
intent to buy beer and drop off Maylin at his home along the way.
The five men got into Adams‟ car. According to the State‟s
evidence at Adams‟ subsequent trial, the following events then
unfolded. En route, Adams asked for beer and gas money from
Gorley, Maylin and Campbell, and when he was told that they had
no money, Adams became enraged. Adams told the men that he
had a knife and a gun and that someone was going to get hurt if he
was not given money. In an apparent attempt to scare the men into
compliance, Adams started driving recklessly, speeding and
running stop lights and stop signs. Gorley, Maylin and Campbell
demanded to be let out of the car, but Adams initially refused to
stop. Eventually, Adams slammed on his brakes in the middle of a
rural road, and the three men got out of the car to escape from him.
Campbell was successful in doing so but the other two men were
not. As Maylin was exiting by the left-rear passenger door, he was
met by Adams, who stabbed Maylin once in the side before Maylin
got away. Adams then stabbed Gorley five times, killing him.
Adams then got back in his car and drove away, with Madrigal still
a passenger. The two men then bought beer, unsuccessfully
looked for the party and then drove to Adams‟ home where he was
arrested.
Adams was charged with first degree premeditated murder,
or in the alternative, first degree felony murder, three counts of
attempted robbery, and one count of aggravated battery. The jury
acquitted on the first degree murder charges and the attempted
1

robbery charges, but found Adams guilty of the lesser offense of
second degree murder and of aggravated battery. The district court
imposed a unified life sentence with twenty-five years determinate
for second degree murder and a consecutive ten-year sentence
with three years determinate for aggravated battery.
State v. Adams, 147 Idaho 857, 859-860, 216 P.3d 146, 148-149 (Ct. App.
2009).
In a later appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals explained the proceedings
that ensued:
Adams filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion for reduction of his
sentences, which the district court denied. In 2009, this Court
affirmed Adams‟ conviction and sentences. Adams subsequently
filed a petition for post-conviction relief and the district court granted
him a new sentencing hearing on the second degree murder
charge. At resentencing, the district court again imposed a unified
life sentence with a twenty-five-year determinate term.
(R., pp.22-23.)1 Following Adams‟ re-sentencing for second degree murder, the
Idaho Court of Appeals again affirmed his conviction and sentence, and the
Remittitur was entered on August 31, 2015. (R., pp.22-24.)
On November 2, 2015, Adams filed a Motion for Credit for Time Served
pursuant to Rules 35(a) and 36, I.C.R., with a supporting memorandum. (R.,
pp.25-29.) Adams argued that his sentences must run concurrent because: (1)
the original second degree murder sentence was vacated in the post-conviction
1

On February 2, 2016, the Idaho Supreme Court entered an “Order Augmenting
Appeal No. 42667 and Take Judicial Notice of Appeal No. 34220.” That order
augmented the appellate record in this case with the Clerk‟s Record, Reporter‟s
Transcripts and Exhibits filed electronically Docket No. 42667, and took judicial
notice of the same items filed electronically in Docket No. 34220. (Id.) Adams
has also requested “this Court to take judicial notice of its file in the appeal in his
post-conviction case, Adams v. State, S.C. Docket No. 42920[,]” which will also
be referenced. (Appellant‟s Brief, p.2, n.2.) Unless otherwise indicated, all
references to the Clerk‟s Record, Reporter‟s Transcripts and Exhibits will be to
this appeal, Docket No. 43791.
2

proceeding, therefore, there was no contemporaneous sentence for his
aggravated battery sentence to run consecutive to, and (2) because the district
court did not expressly state at the re-sentencing hearing that the new sentence
for second degree murder was consecutive to the aggravated battery sentence
(or vice versa), the sentences could only run concurrent. (Id.) On November 18,
2015, the district court entered an order denying Adams‟ motion for credit for time
served. (R., pp.66-67.) Adams filed a timely notice of appeal from that order.
(R., pp.68-69.)

3

ISSUE
Adams states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Adams‟ motion for credit
for time served?
(Appellant‟s Brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Adams failed to show error in the denial of his request for credit for
time served on his sentence for aggravated battery?

4

ARGUMENT
Adams Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Request For Credit For
Time Served On His Sentence For Aggravated Battery
A.

Introduction
Adams challenges the denial of his motion for credit for time served,

arguing that he is entitled to credit on his aggravated battery sentence because it
should run concurrent with his sentence for second degree murder. (Appellant‟s
Brief, pp.6-13.) Contrary to Adams‟ assertions, he has failed to show any error in
the denial of his motion for credit for time served.
B.

Standard Of Review
“The question of whether a sentencing court has properly awarded credit

for time served to the facts of a particular case is a question of law, which is
subject to free review by the appellate courts.” State v. Vasquez, 142 Idaho 67,
68, 122 P.3d 1167, 1168 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing State v. Hale, 116 Idaho 763,
779 P.2d 438 (Ct. App. 1989)). The appellate courts “defer to the trial court's
findings of fact, however, unless those findings are unsupported by substantial
and competent evidence in the record and are therefore clearly erroneous.”
State v. Covert, 143 Idaho 169, 170, 139 P.3d 771, 772 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing
State v. Davis, 139 Idaho 731, 734, 85 P.3d 1130, 1133 (Ct. App. 2003)).
C.

The District Court Correctly Denied Adams‟ Motion For Credit For Time
Served On His Sentence For Aggravated Battery
On appeal, Adams specifically contends: (1) because the original second

degree murder sentence was vacated for re-sentencing, “[i]t could thusly not be
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served consecutive to any other sentence, for no other sentence existed”
(Appellant‟s Brief, p.9); (2) because, upon re-sentencing, “the district court did
not specify whether the second degree murder sentence was to be served
concurrently with or consecutive to any other sentence . . . [it] could only be
concurrent” and the court‟s attempt to reaffirm the consecutive nature of the
aggravated battery charge in the Amended Judgment and Commitment was
ineffectual (id., pp.9-11); and (3) because a sentence cannot be partly
consecutive and partly concurrent, he is entitled to credit for time served for
aggravated battery since his 2007 sentencing (id., pp.11-12). Adams‟ arguments
fail for the following reasons.
Even assuming, arguendo, that Adams‟ original sentence for second
degree murder was “vacated” by either the district court‟s oral ruling at the June
23, 2014 summary dismissal motion hearing (see #42920 Tr., p.80, L.17 – p.85,
L.24), or the resultant Order on Summary Dismissal (see #42920 R., Vol. 3,
pp.1894-1895), his sentence for aggravated battery has consistently remained
consecutive to his sentence for second degree murder.2
Adams‟ original Judgment and Commitment reads in relevant part:
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant be sentenced on Count I,[3] to
the custody of the Idaho State Board of Corrections for a minimum
period of confinement of twenty five (25) years, and a subsequent
indeterminate period of confinement not to exceed life, for a total
aggregate term of life, and the defendant be sentenced on Count II,
2

There is no indication in the record that the court “vacated” Adams‟ sentence
for second degree murder, vis-à-vis, ordered re-sentencing. (See R., pp.36-62;
#42920 R., Vol. 3, pp.1669-1673, 1894-1895, 1933; #42920 6/23/14 Tr.)
3

Count I is second degree murder and Count II is aggravated battery. (R.,
pp.33-34.)
6

to the custody of the Idaho State Board of Corrections for a
minimum period of confinement of three (3) years, and a
subsequent indeterminate period of confinement not to exceed
seven (7) years, for a total aggregate term of ten (10) years, with
said sentences to run consecutively.
(R., pp.33-34 (emphasis added).) The district court could not have stated its
intent any more clearly -- “said sentences to run consecutively.” (Id.)
At the October 15, 2014 re-sentencing hearing, the district court gave
Adams the same sentence it originally ordered -- unified life with 25 years fixed.
(R., pp.31-32 (Amended Judgment and Commitment), 62 (re-sentencing hearing
transcript).) The Amended Judgment and Commitment also stated:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the sentence previously imposed
on May 8, 2007, with regards to the charge of Aggravated Battery
in Count II, and as set forth in the Judgment and Commitment filed
May 15, 2007, shall remain as reflected in said judgment.
(R., p.32 (emphasis added).) Inasmuch as the 2007 Judgment and Commitment
reflects that the two sentences were ordered “to run consecutively” to each other
(R., pp.33-34), the court‟s 2014 Amended Judgment and Commitment reaffirmed
that the aggravated battery sentence was to run consecutive to the second
degree murder sentence. Adams‟ aggravated battery sentence has consistently
been ordered to run consecutive to his second degree murder sentence.
Nonetheless, Adams argues, “once the second degree murder charge
[sic][4] was vacated, the aggravated battery was consecutive to nothing . . . [and
because] [i]t was therefore no longer a consecutive sentence, it was

4

The second degree murder charge was never vacated. The district court
ordered that Adams be re-sentenced on his conviction for second degree
murder.
7

concurrent.”5 (Appellant‟s Brief, p.11 (emphasis added).) Adams‟ assertion that
once his sentence for second degree murder was (arguably) vacated, his
aggravated battery sentence was “consecutive to nothing,” is incorrect.
Idaho Code § 18-308 states:
Successive terms of imprisonment. -- When any person is
convicted of two (2) or more crimes before sentence has been
pronounced upon him for either, the imprisonment to which he is
sentenced upon the second or other subsequent conviction, in the
discretion of the court, may commence at the termination of the first
term of imprisonment to which he shall be adjudged, or at the
termination of the second or other subsequent term of
imprisonment, as the case may be.
Adams‟ argument that, after his second degree murder sentence was vacated,
there was nothing for his aggravated battery sentence to run concurrent to, is
erroneous. Under I.C. § 18-308, the district court had discretion, after Adams
was convicted of his crimes, to order either (of both) of the sentences to run
consecutive with the other. Adams did not have to be sentenced for second
degree murder – only convicted of that crime -- in order for his aggravated
battery sentence to run consecutive to it. Because I.C § 18-308 gave the district
court such discretion, Adams‟ argument must be rejected.
Adams further asserts, “[w]here the district court did not specify that the
second degree murder was consecutive to the aggravated battery the oral
pronouncement controls, and the sentences are concurrent.” (Appellant‟s Brief,
p.11.) Adams‟ focus on the district court‟s silence about whether his second
degree murder sentence ran consecutive to the aggravated battery sentence is
5

Logically, if there was no sentence for his aggravated battery sentence to run
consecutive to, there likewise was no sentence for it to run concurrent with.
8

misplaced.

The issue is whether his aggravated battery sentence had been

changed (from consecutive) to run concurrent with his second degree murder
sentence. As previously shown, the “consecutive” nature of Adams‟ aggravated
battery sentence has steadfastly remained intact. It is irrelevant that the district
court did not orally order, during the re-sentencing hearing, that the sentence for
second degree murder would run consecutive to the aggravated battery
sentence.
Adams next contends that the court‟s statement in the Amended
Judgment and Commitment -- that the 2007 sentence for aggravated battery
“shall remain as reflected in said judgment” -- was “ineffective.”6 (Appellant‟s
Brief, p.10.) He argues that, because “the oral pronouncement controls . . . any
attempt to modify the sentences by correcting or altering the sentences in a
written order was invalid[.]” (Id.) Obviously, the “oral pronouncement” priority
rule pertains to the sentence that is in question. Here, employing that rule makes
no sense because the court re-sentenced Adams for second degree murder, not
aggravated battery. Moreover, the court‟s statement that the 2007 aggravated
battery sentence “shall remain as reflected in said judgment” (R., p.32) cannot in
any way be deemed an attempt to modify or alter the 2007 sentence – it is just
the opposite.

6

The second reason Adams gives for labeling the district court‟s statement as
“ineffective” is that it “was required to make the later-imposed sentence (the
second degree murder) consecutive to the sentence imposed first (the
aggravated battery) once the sentence was orally pronounced on the defendant.”
(Appellant‟s Brief, p.10.) As discussed, that argument is irrelevant to the
question of whether Adams‟ aggravated battery sentence runs consecutive to his
second degree murder sentence.
9

Finally, Adams argues that he “is entitled to credit for time served on the
aggravated battery since his 2007 sentencing.”

(Appellant‟s Brief, pp.11-13.)

This argument fails because it relies on his assertion that his aggravated battery
sentence was rendered “concurrent” in 2007 when the post-conviction court
granted him a re-sentencing hearing on second degree murder, thus (he argues)
making his aggravated battery sentence concurrent. As shown above, Adams‟
“concurrent sentence” argument does not hold true.

As a result, Adams‟

argument that his aggravated battery sentence began to run concurrently with his
second degree murder sentence in 2007 because „“[a] singular sentence simply
cannot be partially concurrent and partially consecutive to another sentence” (id.,
p.11 (quoting Mickelsen v. Idaho State Corr. Inst., 131 Idaho 352, 355, 955 P.2d
1131, 1134 (Ct. App. 1998)), is untenable, and must also be rejected.
In sum, the district court correctly determined that Adams was not entitled
to credit for time served on his aggravated battery sentence because it was
consistently ordered to run consecutive to his sentence for second degree
murder. That Adams was re-sentenced for second degree murder did nothing to
change the consecutive nature of his aggravated battery sentence. Adams has
failed to show any basis for reversal.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court‟s
order denying Adams‟ motion for credit for time served.
DATED this 14th day of September, 2016.

_/s/ John C. McKinney_______
JOHN C. McKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 14th day of September, 2016, served
a true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an
electronic copy to:
SALLY J. COOLEY
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

_/s/ John C. McKinney____________
JOHN C. McKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General
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